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HE concept of duty must evolve in light of the changing conditions
and circumstances of society.' Changing social conditions lead to
the recognition of new duties. 2 In Berly v. D & L Security Services
and Investigations,3 the Dallas Court of Appeals noted that violent crime
has become a significant and pervasive social problem.4 As a result, "the
common law recognizes the duty to take affirmative action to control or
avoid increasing the danger from another's conduct that the actor has at
least partially created."'5 The court held that a store security guard may
owe a duty to protect bystanders against a shoplifter who becomes vio-
lent. 6 Juries may consider whether evidence of prior crimes at the store
established an issue as to whether apprehension of a shoplifter that ended
in death to a bystander was a reasonably foreseeable occurrence.7 On the
other hand, in Bird v. WC. W,8 the Texas Supreme Court declined to find
that a psychologist owed a duty to the patient's father to properly identify
the child. The psychologist had examined a child and concluded that the
child had been abused by his father. The mother filed the psychologist's
affidavit in family court to modify a custody order and gain conservator-
ship of the child. Later, all charges against the father were dropped. The
father then sued the psychologist and her employer seeking damages for
mental anguish, lost earnings and expenses in defending himself. In order
to achieve the goal of eliminating sexual abuse, the court reasoned that
professionals must be able to evaluate children to determine whether
abuse has occurred. 9 The court also noted that the risk of an erroneous
diagnosis of abuse is ameliorated, in part, by the availability of criminal
sanctions against a person who knowingly reports false information in a
custody proceeding. 10
The court distinguished Gooden v. Tips," in which the Tyler Court of
Appeals held that a doctor owed a duty to a third party where the doctor
had failed to warn his patient not to drive while taking Quaaludes. The
court stated that the limited duty found in Gooden did not extend to the
Bird v. WC. W. facts because:
[tihere is little social utility in failing to warn patients about known
side-effects of a drug, but there is great social utility in encouraging
1. Berly v. D & L Security Serv. and Investigations, 876 S.W.2d 179, 188 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1994, writ denied).
2. Id. (citing Otis Eng'r Corp. v. Clark, 668 S.W.2d 307, 310 (Tex. 1983)).
3. 876 S.W.2d at 179.
4. Id. at 188.
5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 188-89.
8. 868 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994).
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. 651 S.W.2d 364 (Tex. App.-yler 1983, no writ).
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mental health professionals to assist in the examination and diagno-
sis of sexual abuse. Furthermore, in Gooden, the plaintiff was
harmed by the resulting actions of the patient, not by the condition,
treatment, or diagnosis of the patient.' 2
Although the psychologist did not owe a duty to the father in regard to
the diagnosis of sexual abuse, the psychologist was not acting in a treat-
ment or diagnosis role when she communicated to the family court
through her affidavit that the father was the abuser. The record showed
that the psychologist acted no differently than any other lay person in
identifying the alleged perpetrator. Her statement was not based on sci-
entific experiment, but upon the outcry of the child. 13 Therefore, the psy-
chologist could be liable for defamation unless some privilege attached to
the communication.' 4 The Texas Supreme Court held that the psycholo-
gist's communication to the court fell within the judicial proceedings
privilege.' 5
In Casarez v. NME Hospitals, Inc.,16 the El Paso Court of Appeals held
that a doctor who admitted an AIDS patient was not liable to a nurse
who allegedly contracted HIV while treating the patient. The court held
that the doctor had a duty to ensure that the hospital and workers within
the hospital knew that they were treating an AIDS patient.' 7 However,
in this case the doctor complied with his duty by informing the hospital's
infectious disease control committee and quality assurance committee of
the patient's AIDS infection.18 The doctor had a right to rely upon the
hospital to institute appropriate isolation procedures and warnings for
persons attending and visiting the patient.' 9
In Verdeur v. King Hospitality Corp.2 0 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals
held that an employer does not owe a duty to protect employees from
injuring themselves when an employee arrives at work in an intoxicated
condition. In Verdeur, after arriving for work one evening with alcohol on
her breath and in a heavily intoxicated condition, the employee was
asked to leave the job. Shortly thereafter, the employee was killed in a
car accident. The employee's beneficiaries brought suit under the wrong-
ful death and survival statutes. The court found no duty existed under the
facts of the case. The court distinguished Otis Engineering Corp. v.
Clark,21 stating that Otis only established a duty on the part of the em-
ployer to protect innocent third parties injured by the acts of an intoxi-




16. 883 S.W.2d 360 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
17. Id at 364.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. 872 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
21. 668 S.W.2d 307 (Tex. 1983).
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cated employee.2 2 Otis did not create a duty requiring an employer to
protect an intoxicated employee from injuring herself.2 3
Likewise, in DeLuna v. Guynes Printing Co.,24 the El Paso Court of
Appeals held the employer owed no duty when off-duty employees drink
on its premises. Several employees met to drink beer in a parking lot of a
common industrial park adjacent to the employer's print shop after work.
An employee subsequently injured two people who brought suit against
the employer, alleging among other things, that the employer knowingly
allowed and failed to prevent the consumption of alcohol on or near its
premises.25 The El Paso Court of Appeals analyzed the case under the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 317. Section 317 imposes a duty
upon the master to control the intentional harm committed by a servant
acting outside the scope of his employment when the servant is on the
master's authorized premises or using the master's chattel, and when the
master knows that he can control the servant and knows of the necessity
and opportunity for exercising such control.2 6 The court held that: "it is
apparent that if Texas recognizes a Section 317 cause of action, it is only
in a limited sense that in order for a duty to arise, the employer must not
only have some knowledge of the employee's condition or incapacity, but
must exercise some control or perform some affirmative act of control
over the employee. '2 7 In the case at hand, the employee had no history
of abusing alcohol on or off the job, the employee had no knowledge that
off duty employees were drinking on its premises, and that the employer
took no affirmative action to control the employee.28 Therefore, the em-
ployer had no duty with respect to the parties injured as a result of the
employee's drinking and driving.29
In Leitch v. Hornsby30 the San Antonio Court of Appeals held that the
"simple tool rule" is not applicable where the employer has a duty to
inspect existing tools, rather than furnish tools.31 An employee injured
his back while lifting a reel of cable wire and claimed his injury could
have been prevented if his employer had furnished him a weight-lifting
belt. The court relied on Harrison v. Oliver,32 holding that "an employer
has a 'nondelegable and continuous' duty to an employee to provide ade-
quate help in performance of his work assignment. '33 The court noted
that an industry standard defense is not dispositive because it would re-
22. 872 S.W.2d at 302.
23. Id.
24. 884 S.W.2d 206 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ requested).
25. Id. at 207.
26. Id at 208-09.
27. Id. at 210.
28. Id.
29. 884 S.W.2d at 206.
30. 885 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, no writ).
31. The simple tool rule relieves an employer of the duty to inspect a tool if that tool is
under the exclusive control and care of the employee, and the tool is of such a character
that the employee should be fully acquainted with its condition. Id. at 246.
32. 545 S.W.2d 229 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, writ dism'd).
33. 885 S.W.2d at 247.
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move the employer's incentive to improve workplace safety.34 The cor-
poration, as well as two corporate officers, was found liable. A corporate
officer or agent may be held personally liable for corporate wrongdoing
in which he is an active participant or has either actual or constructive
knowledge of the tortious conduct.35 In this case, the corporate veil did
not need to be pierced to hold the officers personally liable because they
were found negligent in their own acts.36
The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals addressed the borrowed servant
doctrine in Aguilar v. Wenglar Construction Co.,37 In this case, the court
held that "the borrowed servant doctrine is implicated when the nominal
or general employer loans or supplies an employee to another, who is
termed the special employer and who then has temporary responsibility
for the employee and his conduct. s38 The Restatement (Second) of
Agency section 227(c) sets forth the factors to determine whether a spe-
cial employer exerted the necessary control to establish a borrowed ser-
vant relationship: (1) the machine utilized by the borrowing employer is
both owned by the general employer and operated by the general's em-
ployee; (2) the servant is expected to operate the machine in the way his
general employer would expect while giving only the results called for by
the borrower; (3) the general employer can substitute another employee
at any time; (4) the servant is borrowed for merely a temporary period of
time; and (5) the employee has the skill of a specialist. 39 In Aguilar, the
court found that the plaintiff's foreman controlled such basic things as
where the employee stood and what he physically did to help repair the
belt. Furthermore, the employee had no training, skill, or experience in
performing the task in question and he required basic guidance.40 The
court found this to be exactly the type of direction and control contem-
plated by the borrowed servant doctrine.41
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals recently addressed the question of
whether a landlord has a duty to protect tenants from vicious dogs on the
premises. 42 Finding no Texas cases on point, the court reviewed cases
from other jurisdictions and concluded that a landlord in Texas has a duty
to keep common areas reasonably safe from dogs the landlord knows to
be vicious. 43 The court set out a two-prong test: (1) the injury must have
occurred in a common area under the control of the landlord; and (2) the
34. Id.
35. Id. at 249.
36. Id. at 250.
37. 871 S.W.2d 829 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1994, no writ).
38. Id. at 831.
39. Id. (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 227(c) (1958)).
40. Id. at 832.
41. Id
42. Baker v. Pennoak Properties Ltd., 874 S.W.2d 274 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1994, no writ).
43. Id. at 275-77.
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landlord must have had actual or imputed knowledge of the particular
dog's vicious propensities. 44
In Allen v. Donath45 the Waco Court of Appeals indicated that a golfer
has a duty to warn other golfers before hitting the ball. The court fol-
lowed Hathaway v. Tascosa Country Club Inc. ,46 holding that "for a plain-
tiff to prevail in a cause of action against a fellow golfer, the defendant
must have acted recklessly or intentionally. ' 47 Thus, the standard of care
for golfers is the same reckless and intentional conduct standard applica-
ble to competitive contact sports, rather than an ordinary negligence
standard.48
B. CAUSATION
The Dallas Court of Appeals addressed the issue of causation in Bel-
Ton Elec. Service, Inc. v. Pickle.49 An employer contracted with an elec-
trical company to relocate two sets of switches that controlled a hangar
door. However, the electrical company moved only one set of switches.
An employee programmed the switch that was not moved to automati-
cally close the doors when someone released the switch from the open
position. Subsequently, a fellow employee was crushed to death by the
doors. The court held that the evidence was sufficient to establish that
the electrical company was the proximate cause of the employee's
death.50 When considering the intervening act of the employee who
jammed the switch, the court reasoned that "[tihe intervention of an un-
foreseen cause of the plaintiff's injury does not necessarily mean that
there is a new and independent cause of such character as to constitute a
superseding cause that will relieve the defendant of liability."
5 1
In Frito-Lay Inc. v. Queen52 a company vehicle which was being used
by the employee's roommate hit another car and injured two passengers.
The passengers sued Frito-Lay under theories of negligent entrustment,
negligence per se, and respondeat superior.5 3 There was no evidence that
Frito-Lay's employee was in the vehicle at the time of the accident or that
he had given his roommate permission to drive it.54 The injured passen-
gers introduced evidence that Frito-Lay failed in their duty to investigate
the driving record of their employee before giving him a company vehi-
cle. 55 However, the San Antonio Court of Appeals found the element of
44. Id. at 277.
45. 875 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, writ denied).
46. 846 S.W.2d 614 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ).
47. 875 S.W.2d at 440.
48. Id.
49. 877 S.W.2d 789 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ requested).
50. Id. at 796.
51. Id
52. 873 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ denied).





proximate cause lacking because the entrusted driver was not the same
driver who caused the accident.5 6
C. VICARIOUS LIABILITY
During this Survey period, Texas courts decided several cases involving
vicarious liability. In Riley v. Triplex Communications, Inc.,57 the Beau-
mont Court of Appeals recognized a cause of action for negligent promo-
tion. A radio station and a nightclub jointly promoted a ladies night at
the nightclub. Police officers responding to an accident caused by an un-
deraged drunk driver were struck by another drunk driver and seriously
injured. Both of the drunk drivers had just left the nightclub. The court
rejected the argument that Texas courts only recognize a cause of action
against the seller, server or provider of alcohol. "[W]e do not believe that
our Legislature, through the enactment of Chapter 2, Texas Alcoholic
Beverage Code, intended the exoneration of non-providers and non-sell-
ers of alcoholic beverages, who through possible joint enterprise or
through possible civil conspiracy, become so interrelated with such prov-
iders or sellers, as to defy distinction of conduct and purpose. '5 8 The
court found that the radio station's promotional activities were directed
at inducing both legal age patrons and underage patrons to patronize the
nightclub and purchase and consume as many alcoholic beverages as time
would permit.59
The Texas Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether an oil com-
pany owes a duty of care to protect service station employees from the
criminal acts of third parties. In Exxon v. Tidwell,6° the supreme court
held that such a duty is dependent upon the oil company's right of control
over the safety and security of the service station.61 The prior standard
for determining whether such a duty existed was whether the oil company
maintained the right of control over the gas station's operations.62 The
case was remanded to be decided under the new standard announced by
the court.
In McElroy v. Fitts63 the El Paso Court of Appeals upheld a judgment
against a mother who negligently entrusted her fifteen-year-old son to
drive a pickup truck. The mother purchased the truck for her son who
did not have a driver's license and had not received any driver's educa-
tion. Prior to the accident the son had been given two tickets for driving
without a license and the mother had paid the fines. The court of appeals
56. Id. at 87.
57. 874 S.W.2d 333 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, writ granted).
58. Id. at 349.
59. Id. at 350.
60. 867 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1993).
61. Id. at 23.
62. Id.
63. 876 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1994, writ dism'd by agr.).
19951
SMU LAW REVIEW
held that the mother's acts amounted to conscious indifference and sup-
ported an award of exemplary damages.64
The First Court of Appeals held that a hospital may be liable for the
negligent acts of a staff physician. In Berel v. HCA Health Services, Inc.,65
the court held that while a doctor is generally an independent contractor
for which a hospital cannot be liable for under the theory of respondeat
superior, a doctor is not an independent contractor when the hospital
maintains the right to control the details of the work performed by the
doctor.66 In this case, the court also found that the hospital had a statu-
tory duty under the Mental Health Code to provide adequate medical
and psychiatric care that could not be delegated away.67
In Stites v. Gillum68 the Fort Worth Court of Appeals held that Texas
does not recognize a tort for interference with familial relationships. Af-
ter her husband filed for divorce, the wife filed a counter-petition charg-
ing that the husband's alleged mistress interfered with the familial
relationship. Because there was not a recognizable cause of action al-
leged in the counter-petition, the court upheld Rule 13 sanctions against
the wife's attorney.69
In Helena Laboratories Corp. v. Snyder7o the spouses of two employees
alleged to have had an adulterous affair sued the employer for negligent
interference with familial relationships. The Texas Supreme Court held
that no independent cause of action exists in Texas for the negligent inter-
ference with the familial relationship.71 The supreme court reversed the
decision of the Beaumont Court of Appeals which had held that such
causes of action had not been abolished. The court of appeals relied on
Kelsey-Seybold Clinic v. Maclay,72 in which the Texas Supreme Court
stated: ". . . the Clinic owed a duty to the families of its patients to exer-
cise ordinary care to prevent a tortious interference with family rela-
tions. ' 73 The supreme court pointed out that Maclay was decided before
the enactment of Texas Family Code section 4.06. Section 4.06 "narrowed
the 'legally protected family interests' at stake in Maclay."74 The
supreme court held that the plaintiffs were essentially alleging a cause of
action for alienation of affection which is barred by section 4.06.75 The
supreme court stated that an independent cause of action for negligent
interference with the familial relationship would allow an employer to be
held responsible for an employee's conduct while the employee is
64. Id at 197.
65. 881 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
66. Id. at 23-24.
67. Id at 25.
68. 872 S.W.2d 786 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ denied).
69. Id. at 790.
70. 886 S.W.2d 767 (Tex. 1994)(per curiam).
71. Id. at 768.
72. 466 S.W.2d 716 (Tex. 1971).
73. Id at 720.




shielded by section 4.06.76 The supreme court acknowledged that in some
circumstances, damages may be recovered for such injuries, but only in
connection with some recognized tort.77
D. PREMISES LIABILITY
In Houston Health Clubs, Inc. v. Rickey78 a member of a health club
fell on his health club's jogging track and brought suit alleging negligence
and a violation of the DTPA. The defendant moved for summary judg-
ment claiming among other things that the DTPA has no application in
premises liability cases. The Texarkana Court of Appeals found that the
plaintiff contracted to use the premises for a specific purpose and paid
money for the right to use the facility rather than simply walking in off
the street to shop as an invitee would. 79 Therefore, the court reasoned,
the case was not merely a slip and fall tort case.8° The court of appeals
held that the plaintiff was a buyer of services and, as such, his cause of
action could be brought under the DTPA.8' The Texas Supreme Court
granted the defendant's application for writ on February 2, 1994. How-
ever, on October 6, 1994 the supreme court withdrew its order noting that
writ was improvidently granted.
II. PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE
A. MEDICAL MALPRACTICE
Boney v. Mother Francis Hospital8 dealt with informed consent. The
plaintiff sued her oral surgeon and the hospital for damages resulting
from implantation of a temporal mandibular joint (TMJ) device in plain-
tiff's jaw. The TIyler Court of Appeals held that the duty to disclose medi-
cal risks and possible complications associated with surgery and the duty
to secure written informed consent from the patient is imposed solely
upon the treating doctor.83 The doctor's duty is non-delegable.84 The
hospital in which the surgery takes place does not have a duty to disclose
or to secure the patient's informed consent prior to surgery.8 5
In Parrott v. Caskey,86 the Beaumont Court of Appeals held that a de-
cedent's family had a viable claim under the Survival Statute for dece-
dent's premature death after doctors failed to diagnose her cancer.
76. Id. at 769.
77. Id. at 768.
78. 863 S.W.2d 148 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1993), writ granted, (Feb. 2, 1994), order
withdrawn, (Oct. 6, 1994).
79. Id. at 151.
80. Id at 151-52.
81. Id at 152.
82. 880 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. App.-Tyler 1994, writ requested).
83. Id at 143.
84. Id
85. Id
86. 873 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
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Kramer v. Lewisville Hospital87 abrogated a plaintiff's action under any
theories of lost chance of survival. However, Kramer does not foreclose
the decedent's cause of action for damages resulting from the period of
time when doctors should have determined her cancerous condition, until
such time that she was properly diagnosed.88
The Beaumont Court of Appeals also addressed the issue of compe-
tency of an expert witness' affidavit. In Brown v. Bettinger,89 the patient
claimed that she was injured during a spinal tap. After the defendant
filed for summary judgment the plaintiff responded with a controverting
affidavit from a doctor. The defendant argued that the affidavit was not
competent summary judgment evidence because it failed to establish the
doctor's qualifications as an expert. The affidavit did not state whether
the doctor had any training in the field of neurology or that he had ever
performed a spinal tap. The court held that the doctor's familiarity with
the standard of care required in performing spinal taps raised a reason-
able inference that he had some knowledge or experience in spinal taps.90
Therefore, the affidavit was competent summary judgment evidence.
B. LEGAL MALPRACTICE
The San Antonio Court of Appeals has held that legal malpractice
claims are not assignable. In Zuniga v. Groce, Locke & Hebdon,91 the
defendant lost his personal injury claim and his insurer became insolvent.
Thereafter, the defendant assigned his legal malpractice cause of action to
the personal injury plaintiff in exchange for a post judgment covenant not
to execute. The court held this assignment violated public policy.92
III. INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
The Fort Worth Court of Appeals upheld a judgment totalling almost
$5.8 million against a car dealership that held a deaf mute customer "cap-
tive" for more than four hours. In George Grubbs Enterprises v. Bien,93
the car salesman used high pressure sales tactics to obtain a $4000 check
from the customer, promising to return it after he showed it to his man-
ager. The salesman then refused to return the check. The salesman also
took the customer's keys to the truck the customer was driving and then
refused to return the keys. These tactics were all part of a sales system
adopted by the car dealership with the purpose to "excite, confuse and
pressure the customer in an effort to take every last dime possible from
the customer regardless of the consequences." 94 The plaintiff wrote at
least twelve notes requesting the return of his check, four notes request-
87. 858 S.W.2d 397 (Tex. 1993).
88. 873 S.W.2d at 150.
89. 882 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
90. Id at 958.
91. 878 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1994, writ ref'd).
92. Id at 316-18.
93. 881 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ requested).
94. Id at 852.
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ing that he be allowed to go home, and two notes threatening to go to the
police.95 The record showed that not only did the salesman refuse the
customer's requests, but that they mocked his disability by suggesting that
he use a phone and laughing when he threatened to go to the police.96
The court held that the defendant's conduct was sufficiently extreme and
outrageous to support the jury's finding that the defendant intentionally
or recklessly inflicted emotional distress.97 The court also held that the
jury's finding was sufficient to support the award of exemplary
damages.98
The Texarkana Court of Appeals addressed a claim for intentional in-
fliction of emotional distress in Washington v. Knight.99 A diabetic con-
sented to the amputation of his left leg. The wound did not heal properly
and he had five more operations. Because the patient had become of
unsound mind, his wife consented to the last three operations. Prior to
the last operation the wife became unhappy with her husband's treat-
ment, when informed that her husband would require another operation
she refused to consent to the surgery. At this time, a nurse ripped out the
husband's IV, saying that the husband would not need the IV if the wife
would not consent to surgery. Later that day the nurse and a doctor ob-
tained the husband's consent to surgery even though he was of unsound
mind. While in the recovery room the husband died of respiratory arrest.
The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the clinic on the wife's
bystander claim.100 The court also affirmed summary judgment in favor
of the doctor who performed the surgery regarding the wife's claim for
intentional infliction of emotional distress.1' 1 The doctor's conduct was
not extreme or outrageous because he did not know that the wife did not
consent to the fifth surgery. 02 However, the court found that the con-
duct of the nurse and the other doctor could constitute intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress. 0 3
IV. PRODUCT LIABILITY
A. STRICT LIABILITY
In Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp.104 the plaintiff was
struck by a motorboat while swimming in the San Bernard River. Claims
were brought against the boat's manufacturer and the manufacturer of
the motor and drive unit under theories of negligence and strict liability.
95. Id. at 853.
96. IU
97. Id. at 854.
98. 881 S.W.2d at 860. For a discussion of the exemplary damages issues see infra Part
VIII.C., Exemplary Damages.





104. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 693 (Apr. 20, 1994).
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The plaintiff charged that the motor was defectively designed because
there was no propeller guard. The Texas Supreme Court held that the
Federal Boat Safety Act 10 5 does not preempt state law tort claims. The
court stated that Texas has a significant state interest in providing com-
pensation and relief for its citizens who are injured on its waterways. 1°6
This state interest is particularly strong because the Federal Boat Safety
Act does not provide compensatory remedies.' 0 7 The court held that pre-
emption clauses must be narrowly construed and that state common law
claims will not be preempted unless Congress demonstrates such intent in
clear and certain terms.'08
Similarly, under the heightened presumption against preemption in ar-
eas of traditional state control, the Beaumont Court of Appeals held in
Grinnell v. American Tobacco Co.' °9 that the Federal Cigarette Labeling
and Advertising Act" 0 does not preempt all state common law claims for
injuries, damages, or death sustained as a result of cigarette smoking.
The Act does not preempt strict liability claims for defective design and
manufacture of cigarettes, negligence, strict liability claims for failure to
warn, express and implied warranty claims, and claims based on misrep-
resentations and civil conspiracy."' The Act preempts claims based on a
failure to warn only to the extent that the claims rely on omissions or
material included in a tobacco manufacturer's advertising or
promotions." 2
In Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Glyn-Jones,113 the Texas Supreme
Court held that Texas Revised Civil Statute article 6701d, section 107C(j)
does not prevent disclosure of seat belt usage in a case involving defective
restraint systems. The plaintiff claimed that the restraint systems were
designed and/or manufactured in a defective condition, and that as a re-
sult, she was thrown about her vehicle, causing further injury after being
struck by another car. Bridgestone/Firestone moved for summary judg-
ment contending that section 107C(j) prohibited the plaintiff from intro-
ducing evidence that she was in fact wearing her seat belt at the time of
the collision.'1 4 The Texas statute was enacted to mandate the use of seat
belts and to provide a criminal penalty for the failure to wear a seat
belt.' 15 The last sentence of section 107C(j) states that the "use or non-
use of a safety belt is not admissible evidence in a civil trial.""116 The
court held that the legislature did not intend to preclude evidence neces-
105. 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-4311 (1988).
106. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 696.
107. Id
108. Id at 696-97.
109. 883 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
110. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1988).
111. 883 S.W.2d at 798.
112. Id
113. 878 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. 1994).
114. Id. at 133.
115. Id at 134.
116. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 107C(j) (Vernon Supp. 1995).
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sary to a cause of action against a seat belt manufacturer for injuries
caused by a defective seat belt 117
B. BREACH OF WARRANTY
In Parkway Co. v. Woodruff,118 Parkway was the developer of a resi-
dential community. It was responsible for the layout, drainage, eleva-
tions, gradings, and storm sewers. Parkway sold a lot to a builder, who
then built a house and sold it to the Woodruff's. Two years later, Park-
way regraded the land next to the Woodruff's house and built a concrete
wall that caused water to be diverted onto the Woodruff's property. Af-
ter the Woodruff's house was flooded several times, they sued under the
DTPA and other claims. The court of appeals held that a contract be-
tween the developer and home buyers was not necessary for imposition
of implied warranty under the DTPA.1 9 The court also held that devel-
opers owe an implied warranty to develop property in a good and work-
manlike manner for consumers who ultimately buy the property from a
separate builder.'20 The Texas Supreme Court granted writ to consider
Parkway's contention that the lower courts had improperly created a new
warranty for future development services.
V. DECEPTIVE TRADE PRACTICES ACT
In Sorokolit v. Rhodes,121 the Texas Supreme Court held that section
12.01(a) of the Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act 122 does
not preclude an action for knowing misrepresentation or breach of an
express warranty under the Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA). The
plaintiff went to the defendant doctor for breast augmentation surgery.
According to the plaintiff the doctor instructed her and her husband to
select a picture of a nude model from a magazine and that, following
surgery, her breasts would look just like those in the picture she selected.
When the result was not as guaranteed the plaintiff sued for medical mal-
practice, breach of implied and express warranties under the DTPA, and
knowing misrepresentation under the DTPA. The malpractice claims
were later dropped, but the plaintiff maintained her DTPA claims con-
tending that the doctor's conduct amounted to false, misleading, and de-
ceptive acts and practices. The court of appeals held that the Medical
Liability and Insurance Improvement Act bars DTPA claims for breach
of implied warranty, but not DTPA claims based on knowing misrepre-
sentation or breach of express warranty. 23
117. 878 S.W.2d at 134.
118. 857 S.W.2d 903 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ granted).
119. Id. at 910.
120. Id (citing Luker v. Arnold, 843 S.W.2d 108, 115-18 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1992,
no writ)),
121. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 680 (Apr. 20, 1994).
122. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590, § 12.01(a) (Vernon Supp. 1994).
123. 846 S.W.2d 618 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, writ granted).
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The defendant, in its sole point of error, argued that the Medical Lia-
bility and Insurance Improvement Act precluded actions for knowing
misrepresentation or breach of express warranty under the DTPA. The
defendant asserted that section 12.01(a) was meant to exclude all DTPA
claims against physicians and health care providers. The Texas Supreme
Court held that the language of section 12.01(a) is clear and unambiguous
in its language prohibiting only DTPA claims against physicians or health
care providers for damages alleged to have resulted from the physician's
negligence. 124 However, the court recognized that if the DTPA claim is
not based on the physician's breach of the accepted standard of medical
care then section 12.01(a) does not preclude suit for violation of the
DTPA.125
In Celtic Life Ins. Co. v. Coats, 26 an independent insurance agent rep-
resented that the policy he sold the plaintiff would offer psychiatric hospi-
talization coverage up to a million dollars. After buying the policy and
filing a claim Celtic Life refused to pay more than $10,000 based on a
limitation in the policy. The plaintiff sued Celtic Life under the Insurance
Code, DTPA, and for fraud and misrepresentation. Celtic Life argued
that it should not be held liable for the agent's representations because
the agent was merely a soliciting agent with no authority to bind Celtic
Life and the jury found that the agent did not have the authority to make
representations that were outside the scope of the written document.' 27
The supreme court noted that the Texas Insurance Code makes no dis-
tinction between recording agents and soliciting agents.' 28 Rather, the
Code defines agents generally, and as the independent agent performed
some of the acts listed in the Code on behalf of Celtic Life, he was clearly
an agent of Celtic Life. 129 The supreme court also pointed out that when
the jury was asked whether the agent had authority to explain, on Celtic
Life's behalf, the benefits of the insurance policy they answered affirma-
tively.' 30 The jury had been instructed that such authority can be actual
or apparent.' 3 ' Because the misrepresentation was made in the course of
explaining the terms of the policy-a task the jury specifically found to be
within the scope of the agent's authority-Celtic Life was liable even
though it did not authorize particular representations concerning the pol-
icy.1 32 The supreme court affirmed the actual damages as awarded; how-
ever, treble damages were not available because the Insurance Code
requires a finding of knowing conduct and no such finding was made. 133
124. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 681.
125. Id. at 682.
126. 885 S.W.2d 96 (Tex. 1994).
127. Id. at 98.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 99.
131. 885 S.W.2d at 99.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 100.
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In State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Gandy 34 the Texarkana Court of
Appeals held that when an insurance carrier involves itself in the rela-
tionship between an insured and the insured's attorney, the insured has
standing to bring a DTPA action against the carrier for misrepresenta-
tions made by the carrier concerning the legal services. 135 In the underly-
ing action, the plaintiff sued her stepfather for damages resulting from his
sexual abuse of her. Since some of the abuse took place in the stepfa-
ther's home, he called State Farm, who had insured his home during that
time, and asked them to defend him. Although State Farm notified the
stepfather that there was a question as to whether or not they were obli-
gated to defend him, they finally agreed to do so. State Farm then sent a
letter to the attorney that the stepfather had initially retained to defend
him against criminal charges, asking that all attorney's bills be sent to
them. The attorney had never handled a civil case and improperly an-
swered discovery requests. The stepfather who was under the impression
that State Farm had only agreed to pay the bills from the attorney that he
already retained, settled for $6 million and assigned his right to causes of
action against State Farm to the stepdaughter. The stepdaughter sued
State Farm under the DTPA for failure to provide an adequate defense
and for recovery on the stepfather's insurance policy.
The Texarkana Court of Appeals found that State Farm's letters and
oral communications did not explicitly set out the extent of its responsi-
bility, its relationship with the insured's attorney, or the insured's options
to select counsel of his own.136 The communications used terms of art
and insurance language not familiar to those outside the insurance indus-
try or the legal community and left the insured's position unsettled and
unclear. 137 The court held that the evidence was sufficient to support the
jury's findings of violation under the DTPA.138
VI. DEFAMATION AND FALSE LIGHT INVASION OF
PRIVACY
Although the Texas Supreme Court denied writ in Hagler v. Proctor &
Gamble Manufacturing Co., 1 3 9 a majority of the court disapproved the
analysis of the court of appeals regarding actual malice. The supreme
court stated that actual malice in a defamation case is different from com-
mon law malice.' 4° "Actual malice in the defamation context does not
include ill will, spite or evil motive, but rather requires 'sufficient evi-
dence to permit the conclusion that the defendant in fact entertained seri-
ous doubts as to the truth of his publication.' "141
134. 880 S.W.2d 129 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1994, writ granted).
135. Id at 134.
136. Id. at 135.
137. Id.
138. Id
139. 884 S.W.2d 771 (Tex. 1994).
140. I&
141. Itd at 771-72.
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In response to a certified question from the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit, the Texas Supreme Court held that Texas does not rec-
ognize the tort of false light invasion of privacy in Cain v. Hearst Corp.142
The court reasoned that false light largely duplicates other rights of re-
covery, particularly defamation, and that it lacks many of the procedural
limitations that accompany actions for defamation.' 43 The court com-
mented that the tort of false light, with its lack of procedural limitations,
acted to increase the tension that already exists between free speech con-
stitutional guarantees and tort law.'"
VII. IMMUNITIES
In Green International, Inc. v. State of Texas,' 45 a contractor brought
suit against the State after they refused to pay the amounts claimed due
on construction of three prison units. The first suit was dismissed on the
basis of sovereign immunity. The plaintiff obtained the State's consent to
sue and filed suit again. The State, however, disputed that consent had
been given because the governor had vetoed the legislature's consent res-
olution. The Austin Court of Appeals held that the State's immunity
from suit was not waived, the contractor's claim did not allege a valid
takings claim, denial of redress to the contractor did not violate the con-
stitutional open courts provision, and the legislature's resolution con-
senting to suit never became effective because the governor never
approved the resolution.' 46 The court noted that the State waives immu-
nity from liability when it enters into a contract, but it retains immunity
from suit.' 47
In Hofftneyer v. Hoffneyer148 the Eastland Court of Appeals addressed
the parental immunity doctrine. A father showed his son and a friend
how to shoot a gun at a target located in the father's workshop. After
firing the gun, the son's friend unloaded it. The father later reloaded the
gun and laid it on a table in plain sight, never telling the boys that he had
reloaded the gun. When the father left the two boys alone to go check on
his other children, the son's friend picked up the loaded gun and dis-
charged it, killing the son. The mother, who was divorced from the fa-
ther, sued the father for wrongful death. The court noted that the only
exceptions to the doctrine of parental immunity involve intentional or
malicious acts, acts within the scope of an employment relationship be-
tween parent and child, and acts involving the negligent operation of an
142. 878 S.W.2d 577 (Tex. 1994).
143. Id. at 579-80.
144. Id at 580.
145. 877 S.W.2d 428 (Tex. App.-Austin 1994, no writ).
146. Id
147. Id at 432-33.
148. 869 S.W.2d 667 (Trx. App.-Eastland 1994, writ denied).
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automobile. 149 The court held that the doctrine of parental immunity ap-
plied in this situation and barred the mother's wrongful death claim. 150
VIII. DAMAGES
A. ACTUAL DAMAGES
In Dodge v. Watts' 51 the Amarillo Court of Appeals held that a plaintiff
may recover for physical impairment when he chooses not to perform the
act due to the pain that results from performance of the act. The plaintiff
does not have to prove he is physically unable to perform the act. 152
In determining whether the evidence is sufficient to support an award
of damages for lost inheritance, the Texas Supreme Court in C & H Na-
tionwide, Inc. v. Thompson153 held that such damages are economic in
nature and must be determined as other economic damages. The court
cited Yowell v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,154 which defined loss of inheritance
damages as the present value that the deceased, in reasonable
probability, would have added to the estate and left at natural death to
the statutory wrongful death beneficiaries but for the wrongful death
causing the premature death. The evidence should address who would
have been among the decedent's beneficiaries, whether ordinary family
expenses would have consumed all decedent's income and whether the
ordinary circumstances of life would have exhausted any estate. 155 In this
case, the court held that the element of what the decedent would have
spent to support his family was missing and therefore the award of dam-
ages for loss of inheritance could not be upheld. 56
B. MENTAL ANGUISH DAMAGES
The Texas Supreme Court has granted writ in Krishnan v. Sepulveda 57
to consider whether or not a cause of action exists for mental anguish
caused by the death of an unborn fetus. Parents brought a malpractice
action against an obstetrician alleging that the doctor's negligence caused
their child to be stillborn. The Corpus Christi Court of Appeals held that
the plaintiffs stated a valid cause of action for mental anguish, that the
Wrongful Death Act did not apply to an action for death of a fetus, and
that funeral expenses of the stillborn child were recoverable. 158 Regard-
ing the claim for mental anguish the court of appeals stated that the
149. Id. at 668.
150. IM
151. 876 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1994, no writ).
152. ld at 544-45.
153. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1059 (June 22, 1994).
154. 703 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1986).
155. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 1066.
156. Id.




mother had a valid claim for the mental anguish that she suffered as a
result of the death of her fetus as a part of the injury to her own body.159
In Gross v. Davies160 the Houston Court of Appeals held that the par-
ents of two children who were stillborn have no wrongful death or sur-
vival action based on the stillbirths. The court of appeals refused to
reconsider the Texas Supreme Court's holdings that there is no such ac-
tion based on the death of a fetus.' 61 However, the court of appeals held
that whether the fetus lived or died is immaterial to causes of action for
the physical injuries and metal anguish of the parents.162 In his concur-
ring opinion, Justice Wilson pointed out that the Texas Supreme Court
has not held that wrongful death actions based on the death of a fetus are
not recognized as a matter of policy. 163 Rather, the supreme court has
held that no such cause of action will exist until the Texas legislature says
that it exists. 164 Justice Wilson invited the legislature to address this issue,
stating that "[ilt is time for the Grosses and others like them to have a
firm answer from the one body that can rightly provide it."' 165 Justice
Wilson did, however, point to Justice Dunn's concurring and dissenting
opinion in Witty v. American Gen. Capital Distribs., Inc.166 for the oppos-
ing view that the supreme court can and should act to include a fetus
within the Wrongful Death Act.
In State Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Beaston,167 the Austin Court of Appeals
held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to establish a "knowing"
violation in order to recover jury awarded mental anguish damages. The
court of appeals held that the jury finding that the defendant insurer had
breached a legal duty under article 21.21 of the Insurance Code is all that
is required to recover mental anguish damages.' 68 The Texas Supreme
Court granted writ to determine if "knowing conduct" is a prerequisite to
a mental anguish award.
C. EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
Exemplary damages serve two functions: first, in a function analogous
to criminal law, exemplary damages serve to punish the wrongdoer and,
second, exemplary damages serve the purpose of deterring such conduct
in the future. 169 Traditionally, exemplary damages are permissible when
the defendant is not only guilty of tortious conduct but also acts with a
159. Id. at 136.
160. 882 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
161. Id. at 454.
162. Id. at 455.
163. Id. at 456 (Wilson, J., concurring).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. 697 S.W.2d 636, 641-47 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985), rev'd in part and
aff'd in part, 727 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. 1987).
167. 861 S.W.2d 268 (Tex. App.-Austin 1993, writ granted).
168. Id. at 275.
169. DAN B. DOBBS, TORTS AND COMPENSATION 673 (1985).
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particular state of mind, most often described as malicious or reckless. 170
Texas has also recognized that exemplary damages may help reimburse
the plaintiff for losses such as inconvenience and attorney's fees that are
too remote to be considered as elements of strict compensation. 171 The
Texas Supreme Court has recently attempted to clarify the test for the
awarding of exemplary damages.
In Burk Royalty,17 2 the court defined gross negligence as "that entire
want of care which would raise the belief that the act or omission com-
plained of was the result of a conscious indifference to the right or wel-
fare of the person or persons to be affected by it.'173 This test combines
the two recognized tests for gross negligence in American jurispru-
dence-entire want of care and conscious indifference. 174
In Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 75 the court affirmed that the test
includes both an objective and a subjective component. A gross negli-
gence finding will be upheld if there is some evidence that (1) the defend-
ant's conduct created an extreme risk of harm, and (2) the defendant was
aware of the extreme risk. 176 In Wal-Mart the court concluded that there
was no evidence on record of an extreme degree of risk so they did not
reach the second prong of whether Wal-Mart was aware of the risk. 177
The Texas Supreme Court withdrew its original opinion in Transporta-
tion Insurance Co. v. Moriel'78 and then substituted an opinion that de-
fines gross negligence as: (1) viewed objectively from the standpoint of
the actor, the act or omission must involve an extreme degree of risk,
considering the probability and magnitude of the potential harm to
others, and (2) the actor must have actual, subjective awareness of the
risk involved, but nevertheless proceed in conscious indifference to the
rights, safety, or welfare of others. 179
In its original Moriel opinion, the Texas Supreme Court noted that
Texas jurors are instructed on the factors set forth in Alamo Nat'l Bank V.
Kraus' 80 to assist in determining exemplary damage awards. In the sub-
stituted opinion the court stated that the Kraus factors are to guide Texas
courts of appeals in evaluating exemplary damages awards. 18' The
supreme court held that the court of appeals, when conducting a factual
sufficiency review of an exemplary damages award, must detail the rele-
170. Id.
171. Lunsford v. Morris, 746 S.W.2d 471, 471-72 (Tex. 1988); Cavnar v. Quality Control
Parking, Inc., 696 S.W.2d 549, 555-56 (Tex. 1985); Hofer v. Lavender, 679 S.W.2d 470, 474-
75 (Tex. 1984).
172. Burk Royalty Co. v. Walls, 616 S.W.2d 911 (Tex. 1981).
173. Id. at 920.
174. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Alexander, 868 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. 1993).
175. 868 S.W.2d 322 (Tex. 1993).
176. Id. at 326.
177. Id. at 327.
178. 879 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. 1994).
179. Id. at 23.
180. 616 S.W.2d 908, 910 (Tex. 1981).
181. 879 S.W.2d at 28.
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vant evidence in its opinion, explaining why that evidence either supports
or does not support the award in light of the Kraus factors. 182
In Moriel, the Texas Supreme Court also held that a trial court, if
presented with a timely motion, should bifurcate the determination of the
amount of exemplary damages from the remaining issues.183 If the jury
finds the defendant liable for gross negligence, then the same jury is
presented with evidence relevant only to the amount of exemplary dam-
ages.' 84 The jury determines the proper amount of exemplary damages
considering the totality of the evidence presented at both phases of the
trial.'85
The Beaumont Court of Appeals interpreted Moriel in St. Elizabeth
Hospital v. Graham.'86 While recuperating from a severe head injury in
the hospital's intensive care unit, the plaintiff was placed in a reclining
chair with no restraints. He fell out of the chair and was reinjured. The
plaintiff sued the hospital for negligence and gross negligence resulting
from the injury sustained when he fell out of the chair. The defendant
hospital moved for a bifurcated trial, but the motion was denied. 87 The
plaintiff was allowed, over the hospital's objections, to introduce evidence
of the hospital's net worth. 188 The jury found the hospital negligent, but
not grossly negligent. 8 9 On appeal, the hospital contended that the trial
court erred in denying its motion for a bifurcated trial. Additionally, the
hospital argued that the it was error to permit the jury to hear evidence of
the hospital's net worth when there was no evidence of gross negligence
by the hospital.
Moriel was decided while the appeal in Graham was pending. The
court of appeals first addressed the issue of a bifurcated trial. The court
found that the necessity of a bifurcated trial applied only to cases that
were to be tried after June 8, 1994; therefore, the hospital was not entitled
to a bifurcated trial.19° The court next recognized that Moriel requires an
appellate court to detail the evidence supporting, or not supporting the
punitive damages award. However, the court stated: "[s]ince the jury
awarded absolutely no punitive damages, we have no duty to perform this
tedious task which has been thrust upon us."'19
The court of appeals next addressed the hospital's argument that the
trial court erred in ordering a separate trial on the issue of punitive dam-
ages under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 174. The court of appeals
found no error, noting that a trial court has broad discretion in ordering
182. Id. at 31.
183. Id. at 30.
184. Id
185. Id.
186. 883 S.W.2d 433 (Tex. App.-Beaumont 1994, no writ).
187. Id. at 435.
188. Id. at 436.
189. Id. at 435.
190. Id. at 436.
191. 883 S.W.2d at 437.
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separate trials. 192 The court did point out that Moriel limits that discre-
tion in matters relating to punitive damages.193 The court stated that
"Moriel is going to mandate a revision of Rule 174." 194
In George Grubb Enterprises v. Bein,195 a case involving intentional
infliction of emotion distress, the jury awarded exemplary damages of $5
million. The Fort Worth Court of Appeals refused to order a remittitur,
finding that under the facts of the case, the exemplary damages were rea-
sonably related to the actual damages of $573,815.196 The wealth of the
defendant was included among the factors that could be considered by
the jury in determining the amount of the exemplary damage award. The
defendant cited Moriel to support its argument that the jury should not
have been instructed to consider the wealth of the defendant.1 97 The
court of appeals pointed out that Moriel's focus was on "procedural safe-
guards" such as bifurcation, but it did not change the law with respect to
what factors a jury should consider in determining the amount of exem-
plary damages to award.' 98 The defendant also argued that the jury
should be limited to considering the net worth of the defendant, and not
the assets, wealth, or profitability of the defendant.199 The defendant de-
fined net worth as the amount by which its assets exceed its liabilities.200
The court of appeals held that a jury's consideration of a defendant's fi-
nancial status should not be so limited.201 The court stated that Moriel
left the issue open, allowing juries to consider any evidence relevant to
the amount of exemplary damages.2°2
In Kline v. O'Quinn2° 3 the Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that ex-
emplary damages may be awarded by an arbitrator when the arbitration
clause can be construed to include causes of action sounding in tort.
D. PREJUDGMENT INTEREST
In Sage Street Assocs. v. Northdale Constr. Co.,2°4 the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed that judicially ordered prejudgment interest is not limited
by the anti-usury provision of the Texas Constitution. The anti-usury pro-
vision applies only to lending and credit transactions, and not to transac-




195. 881 S.W.2d 843 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1994, writ requested).
196. Id at 863.
197. Id. at 861.
198. Id
199. ld
200. 881 S.W.2d at 861.
201. Id
202. Id.
203. 874 S.W.2d 776 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
204. 863 S.W.2d 438 (Tex. 1993).
205. d at 440.
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In C & H Nationwide, Inc. v. Thompson,20 6 the Texas Supreme Court
held that prejudgment interest should be awarded on the entire judg-
ment, including future damages. Prejudgment interest accrues during the
period beginning on the 180th day after the date the defendant receives
written notice of a claim or on the day the suit is filed, whichever occurs
first, and ending on the day preceding the date judgment is rendered. 20 7
In Roberts v. Grande,20 8 the court of appeals held that prejudgment
interest should not be added to actual damages before applying a settle-
ment credit.
IX. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The Waco Court of Appeals held that article 4590i, section 10.01 of the
Medical Liability and Insurance Improvement Act is unconstitutional as
applied to minors.209 The statute imposes a two-year statute of limitation
in health care liability cases, except that minors under the age of twelve
years have until their fourteenth birthday to file a claim.210 In Wasson v.
Weiner,211 the plaintiff had surgery to have orthopedic pins inserted in his
femur when he was fifteen years old. Sometime later another doctor
found that the pins had not been placed properly, and at the age of eight-
een, the plaintiff required a total hip replacement. At age nineteen, he
filed suit against the first surgeon. The court relied on Sax v. Votteler212
for the rule that "a statute cannot cut off a minor's cause of action before
he reaches the age of legal capacity. '21 3
In Ion Casu v. CBI NA-CON, Inc. ,214 the Fourteenth Court of Appeals
addressed tolling a statute of limitations because of mental incompetency.
The plaintiff brought suit against two defendants following his injury in a
chemical accident. Over two years later, and over two years past the stat-
ute of limitations another defendant was added. The court held that the
statute of limitations was tolled under Civil Practice and Remedies Code
section 16.001 after uncontroverted medical affidavits were presented al-
leging the plaintiff's mental incompetency.215 The last defendant added
in the suit argued that the plaintiff's failure to join them as a defendant
with the statute of limitation was not caused by the plaintiff's mental in-
competence, and pointed out that the plaintiff had retained counsel and
prior to bringing suit had sent two demand letters to the later joined de-
fendant and had timely filed suit against the two other defendants. How-
206. 37 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 1059 (June 22, 1994).
207. See TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5069-1.05 § 6(a) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
208. 868 S.W.2d 956 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
209. Wasson v. Weiner, 871 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.-Waco 1994, writ granted).
210. TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590i, § 10.01 (Vernon Supp. 1993).
211. 871 S.W.2d at 542.
212. 648 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1983).
213. 871 S.W.2d at 543 (citing Sax, 648 S.W.2d at 667).
214. 881 S.W.2d 32 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, no writ).
215. Id. at 34.
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ever, the court held that knowledge of a potential defendant and
retention of counsel are not enough to "override" section 16.001.216
The court acknowledged that it is possible that the mental incompe-
tence of a client may be used hide legal malpractice, or as an excuse to
keep a lawsuit in court when it should be dismissed. 217 The court also
recognized that it is also possible that the cause of action of a mentally
incompetent client can be kept alive as long as the client is alive. Never-
theless, the court found that such possibilities did not persuade them to
reach a different result. 218
In Ruiz v. Conoco, Inc.,219 the plaintiff was injured in 1984, two years
later he brought suit in Harris County to recover for his injuries. In 1987
he filed suit in Zapata County. Both suits were dismissed. In 1989, five
years after the accident, the plaintiff was adjudicated mentally incompe-
tent from the date of his accident. Shortly thereafter, the plaintiff filed a
third suit relating to the accident through his legal guardian. The last
defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground of limitations.
The defendant argued that limitations were not tolled while the first two
suits were pending because the plaintiff had access to the courts to assert
his rights during that time.220 The Texas Supreme Court held that "the
mere commencement of a lawsuit by, or on behalf of, a legally incapaci-
tated individual is, considered alone, insufficient to deny the protection of
the tolling provision."'221
In Vesecky v. Vesecky, 222 the Dallas Court of Appeals held that the
discovery rule does apply to childhood sexual abuse cases involving re-
pressed memory. In reaching this decision the court relied on L.C. v.
A.D.223 in holding that "the discovery rule applies in childhood sexual
abuse cases where psychological defense mechanisms prevent discov-
ery."'224 In response to the dissent's contention that L.C. should not be
relied on because it was a plurality opinion in which no majority ex-
pressed a single rationale supporting application of the discovery rule to
such cases, the court stated that a majority of the court's justices agreed
that the discovery rule applied; the only disagreement was regarding the
allocation of evidentiary burdens in a summary judgment situation. 225 As
the Vesecky case was on review for directed verdict the disagreement be-
tween the justices was irrelevant. 226 The court also noted that when a
216. Id.
217. Id. at 35.
218. Id.
219. 868 S.W.2d 752 (Tex. 1993).
220. Id. at 755.
221. Id at 756.
222. 880 S.W.2d 804 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1994, writ granted).
223. No. 05-92-02867-CV, 1994 Tex. App. LEXIS 2729 (Tex. App.-Dallas, Mar. 21,
1994, no writ).





plaintiff discovered, or should have discovered, an injury is a question of
fact to be submitted to the jury.227
The Texas Supreme Court refused the defendant's application for writ
of error in Danesh v. Houston Health Clubs, Inc.2 28 The plaintiff mailed
his original petition three days before the statute of limitations expired,
but the petition was not file stamped until the day after the statutory time
expired. The First Court of Appeals held that under Rule 5 of the Texas
Civil Procedures, the plaintiff had timely filed an action by mailing the
petition three days before limitations expired. 229
X. TEXAS TORT CLAIMS ACT
A. PREMISE OR SPECIAL DEFECT
In State of Texas v. Burris,230 a man was killed when he lost control of
his vehicle while trying to avoid another vehicle that had made an illegal
turn into his path. His widow brought suit against the state claiming that
the Texas Department of Transportation had a duty to warn of the possi-
bility of cross-traffic on a highway (even though cars that would be cross-
ing the highway would be making an illegal turn). The plaintiff asserted
that such a condition comprises a special defect. The Texas Supreme
Court held that "[a] condition may be a special defect only if it is an
excavation, obstruction, or some other condition which presents 'an unex-
pected and unusual danger to ordinary users of roadways.' "231
B. USE OR NONUSE OF TANGIBLE PERSONAL PROPERTY
In University of Texas Medical Branch v. York 232 the plaintiff, as guard-
ian for his partially paralyzed son, brought suit against the University of
Texas Medical Branch at Galveston (UTMB) for negligence in failing to
diagnose a broken hip. York contended that misuse of his son's medical
records constituted negligent use of tangible property and such misuse
was the proximate cause of his son's injuries. The Texas Supreme Court
held that although paper is a tangible property, the medical information
recorded on the paper is not.233 Therefore, under the Texas Tort Claims
Act 234 the state retained immunity from suit for negligence involving the
use, misuse or nonuse of medical information contained in medical
records. 235 The court distinguished Salcedo v. El Paso Hospital Dist. ,236
in which it upheld a claim of negligence based on a doctor's misreading of
227. Id
228. 859 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1993, writ ref'd).
229. Id.
230. 877 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. 1994).
231. 877 S.W.2d at 299 (citing State Dept of Highways v. Kitchen, 867 S.W.2d 784 (Tex.
1993) (per curiam)(holding that an icy bridge is not a special defect)).
232. 871 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1994).
233. Id. at 178-79.
234. TEx. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.021(2) (Vernon 1986).
235. 871 S.W.2d at 179.
236. 659 S.W.2d 30 (Tex. 1983).
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an electrocardiogram. The court noted that Salecedo alleged misuse of
the electrocardiogram which "unquestionably" is tangible personal prop-
erty.237 To the extent that City of Houston v. Arney238 and Jenkins v.
State239 differ from the Texas Supreme Court's opinion in York, the cases
were disapproved.
C. NOTICE PROVISIONS
In University of Texas Medical Branch v. Greenhouse,240 the First Court
of Appeals held that the discovery rule does not apply to the notice provi-
sions of the Texas Tort Claims Act.241 One year after a radical mastec-
tomy the patient complained of pains in her chest. The patient's doctor
ordered an MRI which revealed that there was a metal artifact in her
chest. The surgeon performing the mastectomy had left thirty-eight metal
surgical clips in the patient's chest. Following the MRI, however, the pa-
tient's doctor did not specify in his report that the metal artifacts were in
the patient's lower chest area. Therefore, the exploratory surgery was
based on the doctor's incorrect indication as to where the metal artifact
was located. Five months after the patient discovered the discrepancy
between the doctor's report and the results of the MRI she gave the hos-
pital notice of her injury. On original submission the hospital argued that
it did not receive proper notice under the Tort Claims Act because the
patient should have known of her injury after the first MRI. The patient
argued that the discovery rule applied.
The court of appeals originally agreed with the plaintiff, holding that
the discovery rule applied to the notice requirements of the Texas Tort
Claims Act. On rehearing the court reversed and remanded. The court
rejected the patient's argument that if the discovery rule does not apply,
the Tort Claims Act is unconstitutional as a violation of the open courts
provision. 242 The court cited Moreno v. Sterling Drug Inc. 2 43 which set
out the two part test to establish an open courts violation: "first, [the
litigant] must show she has a well-recognized common-law cause of ac-
tion that is being restricted; second, she must show the restriction is un-
reasonable or arbitrary when balanced against the purpose of the
statute."' 244 The court held that the plaintiff failed to meet the first prong
of this test because, but for the Tort Claims Act, the hospital would have
been shielded from liability by the doctrine of sovereign immunity.245
Therefore, the court found that the patient did not have a well-recognized
common-law cause of action.246 The court also cited State Dept. of High-
237. 871 S.W.2d at 178.
238. 680 S.W.2d 867 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ).
239. 570 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1978, no writ).
240. 889 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ requested).
241. TEX. Ov. Pi Ac. & REM. CODE ANN. § 101.101 (Vernon 1986).
242. 889 S.W.2d at 427.
243. 787 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1990).
244. Id at 355.




ways v. Dopyera247 which held that once a plaintiff invokes the proce-
dural devices of the Tort Claims Act, then he is bound by the limitations
and remedies provided in the statute.248 The court stated: "[w]hile we
believe that it is remarkably unfair to deprive [the plaintiff] of her right of
recourse against [the hospital] because she was unable, through no fault
of her own, to comply with the notice requirements, we must agree with
[the hospital] that the trial court erred in applying the discovery rule."249
D. MUNICIPAL LIABILITY
In City of Dallas v. Mitchell,25 0 the Texas Supreme Court held that sec-
tion 75.002 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code did not shield the
City of Dallas from liability when a young boy riding his bicycle in a pub-
lic park fell into a creek. Under section 75.002 the duty owed could have
been no greater than that due a trespasser.251 However, the supreme
court held that the Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 75.002 is
inapplicable because it is a general statute whereas the Tort Claims Act
section 101.022 is a specific statute governing the duty owed to recrea-
tional users of government property, and as such, controls. 252 Under the
Tort Claims Act a governmental entity owes the same duty that a private
individual would owe to a licensee on private property. 253 The supreme
court disapproved Martinez v. Harris County2 5 4 and Tarrant County
Water Control and Imp. Dist. No. 1 v. Crossland255
In Graf v. Harris County,256 the First Court of Appeals followed Mitch-
ell, holding that where a woman tripped on a step in a county arboretum
the county could not claim immunity under Texas Civil Practice and
Remedies Code section 75.002.257 The court then addressed the immu-
nity provided under the Tort Claims Act, section 101.022, finding that if
an injured party paid for the use of the premises, the governmental entity
is liable for ordinary negligence, but if the injured party did not pay for
the use of the premises the governmental entity is liable only for acts of
gross negligence. 25 8
The Texas Supreme Court granted writ on points that included whether
barring judgment against a police officer who struck another driver would
violate the open courts provision of the Texas Constitution. In Thomas v.
Oldham,25 9 a Houston police officer was driving his police car when he
247. 843 S.W.2d 50 (Tex. 1992).
248. Id. at 54.
249. 889 S.W.2d at 427.
250. 870 S.W.2d 21 (Tex. 1994).
251. Id. at 22.
252. Id. at 23.
253. Id. at 22.
254. 808 S.W.2d 257 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
255. 781 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1989, writ denied).
256. 877 S.W.2d 82 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied).
257. Id. at 84.
258. Id. at 85.
259. 864 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1994, writ granted).
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struck a car driven by the plaintiff. A jury found the police officer and
the city jointly and severally liable for $250,000, and the police officer
individually liable for $429,508.20. The court of appeals reversed the
judgment against the police officer, holding that the Tort Claims Act sec-
tion 101.106 barred such judgment.
Similar issues were also presented in Gibson v. Spinks.260 A passenger
was riding in a car struck by a police car. In a trial before the bench, the
court held that the town's immunity was waived under the Tort Claims
Act, but that the town's liability was statutorily limited to $250,000. The
court of appeals affirmed that the police officer was liable for any amount
above the statutory cap. The Texas Supreme Court granted writ to har-
monize Gibson and Oldham.261
In Huckabay v. Irving Hospital Authority,262 the plaintiff was injured
by an x-ray technician at the Irving Hospital. The trial court held that
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code section 101.023(c) limited the
hospital's liability to $100,000. The court of appeals affirmed. The Texas
Supreme Court initially granted writ to address the plaintiff's claim that
the hospital was a "function of a municipality," raising the limit of liabil-




In Texas Workers' Compensation Comm. v. Garcia,263 the Texas
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1989 Worker's Com-
pensation Act. The court held that the Act did not violate the Texas Con-
stitution's guarantees of open courts, due course of law, equal protection,
trial by jury, and obligation of contract.
B. INSURANCE POLICY EXCLUSIONS
In National County Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Johnson,264 the Texas Supreme
Court affirmed that the "family member exclusion" is inconsistent with
the public policy underlying the Texas Motor Vehicle Safety-Responsibil-
ity Act.265 In a plurality opinion the supreme court held the exclusion
invalid, at least up to the minimum coverage mandated by the compul-
sory insurance provision of the Act.266
However, the Houston Court of Appeals in Bergensen v. Hartford Ins.
Co. ,267 upheld a family member exclusion in uninsured/underinsured mo-
260. 869 S.W.2d 529 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1993, writ granted).
261. 864 S.W.2d 121.
262. 879 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1993, writ dism'd).
263. 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 235 (Feb. 9, 1995).
264. 879 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. 1993).
265. TEX. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6701h, § 1(10) (Vernon Supp. 1993).
266. 879 S.W.2d at 5.
267. 845 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1992, writ ref'd).
1995]
1492 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48
torists provisions of an automobile insurance policy. The court reasoned
that the underinsured provision was intended to protect the insureds
from other motorists who did not have adequate coverage on their
automobiles, not to protect the insureds from their own failure to secure
adequate liability insurance.2 68
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. S.S. and G.W.269 involved an intentional
injury exclusion. After engaging in consensual sexual intercourse with
G.W. at his home, S.S. contracted genital herpes. S.S. notified G.W. and
asked that he compensate her for her injuries. G.W. contacted his home
owner's insurance company at this time, but later when S.S. filed suit
claiming that G.W. had negligently transmitted the herpes to her, G.W.
did not notify the insurance company. S.S. and G.W. settled, agreeing to
a judgment of $1 million in favor of S.S. The insurance filed a declaratory
judgment action claiming that it was not obligated to pay the $1 million
judgment because, among other things, G.W.'s policy contained an inten-
tional injury exclusion. The Texas Supreme Court affirmed the court of
appeal's holding that a fact issue existed as to whether G.W. knew that
engaging in sexual intercourse with S.S. was substantially certain to result
in transmission of herpes to S.S. T27 The record showed that G.W. was
operating under the mistaken impression that he could not transmit
herpes when he had no active symptoms of the disease.2 71
In Hernandez v. Gulf Group Lloyds,272 the Texas Supreme Court held
that an insurer cannot rely on a "settlement without consent" exclusion to
deny a claim unless the insurer proves that it was prejudiced by the in-
sured's failure to comply with the consent requirement.
The Texas Supreme Court withdrew its original opinion in American
Physicians Ins. Exch. v. Garcia,273 in which it held that the existence of a
non-execution covenant between a plaintiff and an insured does not pre-
clude the plaintiff, as the assignee of the insured, from recovering dam-
ages from the insurer. The underlying suit was a medical malpractice
claim against Garcia. Dr. Garcia was covered by one insurance company
during 1982 and another in 1983. Each carried a $500,000 insurance pol-
icy. The plaintiffs sent a letter to each insurance company indicating that
their malpractice allegations were based on a course of treatment that
concluded with one office visit in 1983. Based on the letter both insur-
ance companies agreed to defend Garcia. But, the plaintiffs did not actu-
ally plead any negligence occurring in 1983 so the second insurance
company notified Garcia that its policy did not apply. Garcia assigned his
claims against the insurers to the plaintiffs. In return, the plaintiffs signed
a covenant not to execute against Garcia. The plaintiff's ultimately won
$2 million in the medical malpractice action. In the new opinion the
268. Id. at 377.
269. 858 S.W.2d 374 (Tex. 1993).
270. Id. at 378.
271. Id. at 379.
272. 875 S.W.2d 691 (Tex. 1994).
273. 876 S.W.2d 842 (Tex. 1994).
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court does not address the issue of the non-execution covenant, but re-
views the Stowers duty to settle.
More recently, in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus. Inc.,274 the
Texas Supreme Court upheld the pollution exclusion contained in most
standard CGL insurance policies. Like Garcia, CBI Indus. deals more
with insurance and coverage matters than general tort law. However,
both cases present important issues that may arise during the course of
tort litigation.
274. 38 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 332 (Mar. 2, 1995).
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